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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PARENTAL
SUPPORT LAWS
* Martin R. Levy
** Sara W. Gross
This article addresses the constitutionality of those statutes
known as "parental support laws" or "relative support statutes" in
light of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.' These statutes impose upon a per-
son the duty to support an indigent parent or other impoverished
relatives. This article focuses only on the statutory duty of chil-
dren-under threat of punishment-to support indigent parents .2 In
order to pass Constitutional muster under the requirements of the
equal protection clause, there must be established at least a rational
relationship between the class designated by the statute and the
objective of the statute; that is, there must be a nexus between the
burdened class and the objectives of the statute which singles out
that class from society. We have assumed that fundamental rights
requiring strict scrutiny for equal protection analysis are not in-
volved in evaluating these statutes, and that only a rational basis
is required to support the statutes.
In establishing whether or not a rational relationship exists be-
tween children of the indigent and the goal of making that class
responsible for the support of less fortunate parents, it is necessary
to determine whether the logic requiring a parent to support his
child works equally effectively in reverse. In other words, if a parent
has a duty to support his offspring, does the state thereby have the
right to require a child to support a parent in need? Further, it is
necessary to examine whether the parent-child relationship itself
supports the constitutional premise.
* B.S., Lafayette College, 1957; M.CH.E., University of Virginia, 1958; LL.B., University
of Maryland, 1967. Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
** B.A., Univeristy of Louisville, 1970; M.A., 1971. Law student, University of Louisville.
1. U. S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. In Virginia, the relevant statute is at VA. CODE ANN. §
20-88 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
2. Lopes, Filial Support and Family Solidarity, 6 PAC. L. J. 508 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Lopes].
3. P. BRFsr, PROCESSES OF CONSTuritUONAL DECISIONMAKING 558 (1975).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
There are three theories that proponents of the statute implicitly
rely on: 1) the analogy to parent-child support statutes; 2) the novel
theory of relational interests; and, 3) the contract theory that be-
cause a parent supports a child, the child should support a parent.
That is, in receiving aid, a rational basis is established for thereafter
providing it. In the authors' opinion none of these views provides a
rational basis for imposing a duty of parental support on children,
and so, these statutes are unconstitutional. This article will further
show that the sociological and economic effects of those statutes
have been unsatisfactory in actual practice and also that the stat-
utes have been applied haphazardly.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The "responsible relative" statutes date from the Elizabethan
Poor Law of 1601, which was a successful attempt by the state to
rid itself of the burden of supporting indigents by designating rela-
tives to bear the duty of support. Indeed, the Elizabethan statutes
did not merely limit the duty to direct offspring of indigents, but
also broadened the family sphere to encompass such relationships
as husband-wife, grandparents-grandchildren, and siblings.4
The ostensible purpose behind these statutes was to provide for
the poor, but the real thrust of the law was to shift the burden of
welfare measures from the state to a relative of the poor person.
While such a person might not really be "capable" of supporting his
indigent relative, the punitive threat of fine or imprisonment was
impetus to do so. This "real purpose" of relieving the drain on the
common trough under the more lofty guise of filial duty was also the
basis of similar American laws.5
It should be noted that no such duty of a child to support his
parent existed at common law.6 The statutes in many states are
justified by the theory that the state would force more fortunate
relatives to assume their moral duty of support for their less fortun-
ate relatives. In this view the support has as its primary purpose the
instance of the indigent party rather than relieving the burden on
the state. A Kentucky case, holding for contribution from more than
4. The full history of these cases is set forth in Lopes, supra note 2, at 508-19.
5. Id. at 511.
6. 32 CHI.- KENT L. REv. 334, 335 (1954).
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one relative, supports this view.' However, a West Virginia court
held that no contribution should be demanded of others once one
sibling has been required to support indigent parents.8 The theory
relied upon is that once the state has been relieved of its duty to
support, it has no real interest in how the indigent party is to be
maintained.
Thus, the objective of supporting the indigent parent has neither
a consistent basis nor application. In some states, it is a moral
imperative; in other states, a sincere concern for the plight of the
poor; and yet in others, a frank desire to wash state hands publicly
and find a class anywhere, anyhow, to assume an unwieldy and
unwanted burden.
H. APPLICATION OF PARENTAL SUPPORT STATUTES
These statutes have been applied haphazardly. For example, in
Duffy v. Yordy 9 an aged mother being cared for by one child sued
another child for contribution to her maintenance under a statute
imposing that duty on "children." It was held that such an action
for contribution could not be maintained once she was actually
being cared for since the vital factor in civil liability is the condition
of actual want."° Hence, there is an apparant denial of equal protec-
tion to a paying child where the same statute makes one child ame-
nable to suit and not another. The state admitted in Duffy that once
its duty of support has been shifted, and the want of the needy party
has been satisfied by someone, the state no longer cares how the law
shall apply to that someone. The party affected thus becomes, in
effect, an arbitrary choice and a victim of fate.
In Reed v. Reed," the Supreme Court spoke to the very type of
arbitrary application of a statute that occurred in Duffy. That case
held that the rational basis requirement of equal protection requires
minimally that the classification be based upon "some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced are treated
7. Wood v. Wheat, 226 Ky. 762, 11 S.W.2d 916 (1928).
8. Connell v. Connell, 131 W.Va. 209, 46 S.E.2d 724 (1948).
9. Duffy v. Yordy, 140 Cal. 140, 84 P. 838 (1906).
10. Id.
11. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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alike." 12 Two siblings, both able to support an indigent parent, are
certainly "similarly circumstanced," but in Duffy, they are not
"treated alike." In the same vein, another definition of the mini-
mum standard for the rational basis requirement of equal protection
states that "[a] reasonable classification is one which includes all
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law.' 3 Under Duffy, the two parties similarly situated are not in-
cluded in the same class as to the duty imposed. Indeed, it is the
thesis of this article that children generally are not a class different
from the world at large with regard to support of indigent parents.
Another question is whether illegitimate children are liable for
support of indigent parents under these statutes. In Lee v. Smith,"
the New York court interpreted "child" in their statute to include
illegitimate children vis-a-vis the duty to support an indigent par-
ent. The court cited the increasing rights and protections of illegiti-
mates as a sufficient logical basis for implying a greater obligation
and duty on their part. In commenting on this case, one author said:
The court's construction of the statute as including illegitimate chil-
dren appears consistent both with the purpose of the legislature to
shift the burden of supporting indigent adults from the taxpayers to
financially capable blood relatives of the poor, and with the tendency
to give bastards the legal status of legitimates-a tendency which, if
not carried out to impose duties as well as rights, would favor bas-
tards over legitimate children.'5
However, in Castellani v. Castellani,'" a decision totally inconsist-
ent with Lee v. Smith, the New York court emphasized the "scanty"
nature of the rights accorded to illegitimate children as being a basis
too insufficient for creating the same support duty as legitimate
children.' 7 Once again, members of a class similarly situated are
12. Id. at 76. See also Levy & Duncan, The Impact of Roe v. Wade on Paternal Support
Statutes: A Constitutional Analysis, 10 Fss. L. Q. 179, 183 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Levy].
13. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346
(1949).
14. Lee v. Smith, 161 Misc. 43, 291 N.Y. Supp. 47 (1936).
15. Note, Duty of an Illegitimate Child to Support Its Destitute Moth er, 46 YALE L. J. 875,
878 (1937).
16. Castellani v. Castellani, 176 Misc. 763, 28 N.Y. Supp. 2d 879 (1941).
17. Note, Duty of Illegitimate Child to Support His Parent, 36 IL.. L. REv. 686, 688 (1942).
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treated differently by the same law. It is not clear whether in present
society these cases would be decided consistently, but this haphaz-
ard application provides further reason to examine the basis of the
laws in detail.
III. THE CALIFORNIA CASES
Some of the more recent challenges to the constitutionality of the
"responsible relative" statutes involve a series of five California
cases from 1958 to 1973.
First, in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley,"8 the court
dealt with a criminal proceeding in which a man murdered his wife
and was subsequently confined in a state mental institution. Under
the California support statute, 9 the state forced a son to pay for his
father's confinement. The son successfully challenged the statute on
the grounds that a public interest was involved in confining and
reclaiming an individual via the criminal law proceeding of the state
and that the cost of such a public interest should not be chargeable
to a private individual. The court held that the logical nexus be-
tween the social objective and the private class sought to be charged
could not be justified as a rational basis for singling out that class.
So, a violation of equal protection was found and the child was not
liable for support."0
In Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,21 a situation basi-
cally similar to Hawley existed in a civil context. Here the court
found that the sequestration of mentally defective persons in state
institutions was primarily a state function, the cost of which must
be borne by the state. Any attempt to shift such a public cost onto
a private class of individuals would be arbitrary and, therefore,
violative of the equal protection clause. 2
18. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d
22 (1963).
19. CAL. CiV. CODE § 206 (West 1954).
20. See generally Note, Relatives' Support Liability: Two Years After Kirchner, 18
HASTINGS L. J. 720 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Relatives].
21. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d
720 (1964).
22. One commentator finds no rational basis for naming private individuals as being obli-
gated to shoulder the duty to support an indigent relative. He states:
Modem judicial analysis of an equal protection question first defines the purpose of
1979]
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The California Supreme Court in Kirchner implied that as far as
the mentally incapacitated are concerned, there is a pre-existing
legal duty incumbent upon the state rather than a private individ-
ual. A relative cannot be properly charged with the cost of mental
confinement by the state of one of his family members unless he
bears a pre-existing legal duty. Why find a pre-existing legal duty
on children who have their own responsibilities and concerns? Must
they not support their own children? Why not place the burden on
the society as a whole which has benefited from the indigent elderly
individual's labors during his or her working lifetime?
Responding to the California Supreme Court's decisions of
Hawley and Kirchner, in the County of Alameda v. Espinosa,2 a
court of appeals attempted to define the public versus the private
interest in terms of duty to assume the cost of support. This case
held that where the primary purpose of the confinement was public,
the state could impose no demand for reimbursement. upon a private
relative. If, however, the purpose of the confinement involved the
objective of individual rehabilitation as strongly as that of public
protection, then an individual relative could be forced to reimburse
the state-if he had a statutory duty to support.24 The court here
seemed to assume the constitutionality of support laws that would
impose a legal duty to support relatives who are mental patients.
Regarding another problem, the California Supreme Court, in
County of San Mateo v. Boss,25 found no duty for a relative to
reimburse the state for benefits conferred upon a needy recipient.
Boss emphasized the need for a statutory legal duty and stated
further that there is no common law duty for children to support
"needy" parents. The court also considered "in need" to be different
from "poor" as set forth in the statute and thereby sidestepped a
constitutional confrontation by semantics. So, recovery by the
the statute under attack, then defines the classification established by the statute, and
finally attempts to determine whether there is a reasonable relation between the pur-
pose and the classification.
He suggests, essentially, that support of the elderly indigent is a proper function and duty of
the state which cannot be imposed upon individuals without resulting in a violation of equal
protection. Lopes, supra note 2, at 529-31.
23. 243 Cal. App.2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1966).
24. See generally Relatives, supra note 20, at 723-24.
25. County of San Mateo v. Boss, 3 Cal. 3d 962, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654 (1971).
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county was denied and the right of the plaintiff not to pay support
was upheld. Subsequently the California Legislature changed the
wording of the support law from "poor" to "in need" which effec-
tively foreclosed any further attempt by a court to examine the
financial condition of the alleged recipient."
The most recent California case in which support statutes were
treated is Swoap v. Superior Court.Y In this class action by both
parents and children, a restraining order was issued to the Califor-
nia Department of Social Welfare enjoining enforcement of filial
support laws. This order was overturned on appeal, in which the
constitutionality of the laws was upheld on the basis of equal protec-
tion. The court found the classification of children as having the
burden of support of parents to be a rational one "since these chil-
dren received special benefits from the class of 'parents in need,' it
is entirely rational that the children bear a special burden with
respect to that class."
IV. THEORIES TO SUPPORT A RATIONAL BASIS
A. Analogy to Parent-Child Support Statutes
The above quote in Swoap is the only language of the California
Supreme Court addressing the rationale behind the underlying issue
of parental support laws, and thus needs to be re-examined. Swoap
assumed that the duty of a child to support his parent is a mirror-
image of the parents' responsibility to support a child. The proposi-
tion is offered by the court as a simple truism inherently logical and
too apparent to demand analysis. However, breaking that down into
fundamentals, the language requires children to support parents on
an implied contract (which will be dealt with later) or based on the
same theory that requires parents to support children.
But, the logic of parent-child support does not bear out a duty of
child-parent support in view of responsibility stemming from voli-
tional acts. The parent bears a duty to support the child since there
is "a rational relationship of nexus between the father's act of inter-
course and the birth of the child. '29 In other words, the volitional
26. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 206 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
27. Swoap v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 516 P.2d 840 (1973).
28. 516 P.2d at 851. See Lopes, supra note 2, at 532-33.
29. Levy, supra note 12, at 179.
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act directly responsible for the birth of the child serves as a rational
basis for assigning responsibility and a legal duty of ,upport for the
result of that act.
This duty of parent-child support has been analyzed in a law
review article written in light of the United States Supreme Court
holding in Roe v. Wade." The article determined that even though
the mother would, in effect, have sole responsibility fbr the decision
to bear or not to bear a child, the nexus between the father's act of
intercourse was not sufficiently broken to alleviate him of the bur-
den of responsibility for the birth of the child. This article concluded
in part: "The mother's decision to bear does not interrupt the natu-
ral sequence of events but rather allows the natural sequence of
events to take place. Thus, the mother's decision to bear is not a
sufficient intervening cause to shift the burden of support from the
father to the mother. '31
Thus, the real justification for parental duty to support a child
becomes a matter of proximate cause. By the voluntary act of pro-
creation, a parent sets in motion an unbroken sequence of biological
development culminating in birth, and responsibility for support is
assigned accordingly. Where the burden of support depends upon
responsibility and all who are responsible bear the burden, the ra-
tional basis requirement of equal protection is satisfied.
In the converse situation of the duty of a child to support a parent,
there is no proximate cause, no volitional act, and no rational basis
for the demand for support. The child has not acted to bring about
the life of the parent. Thus, taking his property to support a relative
for whose existence he bears no personal responsibility is arbitrary.
While a father assumes the voluntary status of fatherhood, the child
assumes no duty by having been born. His birth is the result of the
act of the father and mother and such a result cannot logically or
physically be turned into proximate cause.
Since there was no volitional act or control by the child, there can
be no responsibility based on this act. Creating a c!Lass of children
bearing the duty to support parents based on this theory is thus
arbitrary. Since the class has no rational connection with the duty
30. Id.
31. Id. at 195.
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imposed upon it, there is a denial of equal protection. Thus, this
theory underlying the Swoap decision cannot stand.
Moral duty and gratitude, or lofty ideals, cannot be used as a
justification for the taking of property. It has been urged that the
duty to suppport indigent parents is a moral imperative originally
imposed by nature which should be reinforced by statute.3 2 How-
ever, the law should not act in lieu of conscience or in forcing an
action in the public tribunal that should properly remain a matter
in the private domain of individual morality. The "notion of a duty"
purposed by nature here has no biological foundation. The duty
dictated by natural law, which should be assumed by all who bear
it, is really love and affection. This is considered in the next section.
B. The Relational Interests of Family Status
Is there a duty arising from the very fact of relational status? In
his inquiry into Roscoe Pound's exposition concerning the compet-
ing and interacting interests inherent in domestic relations,1 Henry
H. Foster examined the notion of how areas of the law have evolved
into a champion of family status. There is special emphasis on the
fact that there are "four types of family relationships secured at
least in some measure by law-those of parents, children, husbands,
and wives-and that each type of claim might be asserted against
the world or against the other party to the relation.3'
Along with products liability and medical malpractice, family law
ranks in the vanguard of those areas most in ferment in the law. The
family is no longer a private domain, and its concerns and problems
have been pushed into the public arena of open scrutiny. As early
as 1916, Pound had already noted "trends in the law and foresaw
anT increasing public concern with the internal affairs of the fam-
ily." This has materialized in a public preoccupation with regard
to traditionally private matters such as discipline of juveniles, abor-
tion, and medical care for the aged.
32. Note, Parent and Child: Responsibility of Adult Child for the Support of Needy
Parents, 33 NoTR DAME LAw. 108, 109 (1957).
33. Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962 ILL. L. F. 493 (1962).
34. Id. at 493.
35. Id.
1979]
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In the law itself this ferment has manifested itself in many areas.
Now a parent may recover in many states for the loss of affection
and companionship of a minor child in a wrongful death action
where formerly he was limited to recovery of mere pecuniary loss.
Many states have abolished interspousal and intra-familial tort
immunities, concepts once revered as sacred cows whose desecration
would bode ill for harmonious hearths. Changing mores, pressing
needs, and rising expectations as to notions of individual equality
have all contributed to the public incursion into this settled, inti-
mate circle of relationships.
In 20th century America, status and its incidents have undergone
substantial modification as to both husband and wife and parent and
child, including their rights and duties inter se and their relationships
to outsiders and society. No longer is the family a semi-autonomous
government, for both custom and law have moved to abandon the
concept of paterfamilias .... Moreover, the principle of equality
has won out over the principle of subordination in most areas of
family law so that the claims of the wife or child may prevail over
those of husband or father. . . . In short,. . . legal doctrines which
once governed family relations have been expressly or impliedly mo-
dified or repudiated as the family has emerged as a different institu-
tion, as social values have changed, and as the social interest in the
individual has given rise to welfare legislation."
The theme underlying many of these changes has been a greater
regard for individuals as persons and the emotional realities of rela-
tionships rather than individuals viewed solely in the context of the
family relationship.
Relational interests might be used by some to buttress parental
support statutes on the theory that these relationships involve love
and affection between parent and child which gives a rational basis
for these statutes. But, in view of the emotional realities of the
individuals involved, the relational interest can be viewed as being
both too broad and too narrow to serve as a criterion for determining
the duty to support indigent relatives. It is too broad in considera-
tion of the fact that not all children love and revere their parents.
The status of a child confers no special emotional tie in and of itself.
36. Id. at 496.
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In order to justify the parental support laws under this theory, it is
necessary to presume that loving concern and gratitude flow natu-
rally from the child-parent relationship, making support of parents
incumbent upon any child who is not so "unnatural" as to suppress
these emotions. However, the status of a child can be merely an
adventitious occurrence rather than the sacred bond conferred prov-
idently and deliberately by devoted parents. Thus, the presumption
of "natural bond" fails by logical overbreadth. What about victims
of child abuse? What about the myriad of factors that would tend
to paint an ugly face over the idyllic parent-child relationship if they
were known or acknowledged?
In addition to being overly broad, the relational interest as a basis
for these laws can also be found inadequate as being too narrow in
scope. Assuming that loving concern and gratitude should naturally
flow from the parent-child relationship and that thereby a duty to
support is created, it would then seem to follow that the child should
become liable to support all those for whom he feels the same emo-
tional commitment-not necessarily parents. Using this rationale,
the logic of relational status would fail to encompass many other
possible candidates for support-a dear, indigent neighbor, mentor,
or relative too distant to be statutorily included within the ambit
of the support statutes. Thus, basing a duty upon the relationship
alone fails as being both overinclusive and underinclusive and pat-
ently restrictive.
C. Contract Analogy
A last argument in favor of the relative support laws is that there
exists some sort of relation of the child to the parent by virtue of
having been supported with the idea being that the recipient of
support has a continuing nexus to the giver. This immediately calls
to mind a contract analogy. Should there actually be a basis for such
support in a theory of contract, the state would then have its ra-
tional basis for designating children as a class responsible for sup-
porting indigent parents. This theory also may underlie Swoap.
There can be no assertion that a direct contract negotiated be-
tween two consenting parties has been brought into being between
parent and child. So, any consideration of a contract theory in this
context must revolve around an analogy to implied or quasi-
contract.
1979]
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An implied contract arises by means of "[a] promise that is
implied in fact is merely a tacit promise, one that is inferred in
whole or in part from expressions other than words on the part of a
promisor. It is a question of fact whether or not in a particular case
a promise should be so inferred."37 Thus, an implied contract pre-
supposes the concurrent existence of the parties engaged in some
sort of mutual activity from which the law can draw inferences as
to their assent to specific conditions. The opportunity for two par-
ties to communicate as to a common area of interest must exist or
there would be nothing upon which to base an inference:
"Contractual duty is imposed by reason of a promissory expression
. . . . The language used to express assent, whether of words or of
other signs and symbols, may be one invented by the parties them-
selves for their own private communications .... ,31
Because the two parties necessary to the contract do not exist
simultaneously at the moment of "making" the duty of support,
which is conception, implied contract is an inappropriate theory in
the parent-child relation. There is a lapse of nine months from
conception until one party even exists, and then that party is incap-
able of contracting at all until reaching the age of majority.
The concept of a promise implied in law is more appropriate.
Thus:
When a promise is said to be 'implied in law,' it is meant that neither
the words nor the other conduct of the party involved are promissory
in form or justify any inference of a promise. The term is used to
indicate that the party in question is under a legally enforceable duty,
just as he would have been if he had in fact made a promise."
The duty of a parent to support a child is one imposed by law arising
from the very status of parenthood. He or she need not assent by
words or acts in order to assume the obligation. Once the status of
parenthood is attained, the law automatically creates the obliga-
tion.4 The issue then becomes whether, by analogy, a reciprocal
obligation is created in the party for whose benefit the duty was
37. CORnI, CONTRACTS § 17, at 24 (1952) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN.
38. Id. § 18 at 25 (emphasis added).
39. Id. § 17 at 24.
40. Id. § 19 at 27.
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originally imposed. That is, does the pre-existing duty of a parent
to support a child imply a subsequent duty for the child to support
the parent?
As a matter of contract law, the performance of a pre-existing
duty is insufficient to serve as consideration for implying a promise
in another party. As Corbin states: "The very frequently stated rule
is that neither the performance of duty nor the promise to render a
performance already required by duty is a sufficient consideration
for a return promise."'" "Legal duty" is a pre-existing duty and is
defined along lines that accord perfectly with the states' require-
ment of parental support for a child:
One is under a legal duty when some performance is required of him
and some form of societal compulsion is applicable against him.
Compulsion does not necessarily mean the application of force to his
person . . .it also includes any other form of societal sanction or
penalty that is made applicable for the purpose of inducing perform-
ance."
Therefore, the action of the state in imposing a duty upon parents
to support children, and then inferring from that duty by analogy
that children should support their parents, is lacking in any founda-
tion in contract. Performance of a pre-existing duty by a parent
cannot serve as "valuable consideration" creating a nexus to pro-
vide a rational basis for the obligation of a child to support his
parent.43
41. Id. § 171 at 245.
42. Id. § 171 at 246-7.
43. Cases involving pre-existing duties hold that it cannot serve as consideration for a
return promise or even for a reward. For example, it is contrary to the pre-existing duty rule
for a public official or a law enforcement officer to accept a reward for rendering services in
his official capacity. Where a police officer obtained special information concerning a dia-
mond theft, he was held ineligible to receive the reward promised since his official duty
required that he assist the public in precisely the kind of matter involved. "The services he
rendered in this instance must be presumed to have been rendered in pursuance of that public
duty, and for its performance he was not entitled to receive a special quid pro quo." Gray v.
Martino, 91 N.J.L. 402, 103 A. 24 (1918).
Where a reward is offered, acceptance by performance is void where that performance is
done by a public official within the scope of duty. "Performance of the terms of the offer
constitute sufficient consideration, but performance by one otherwise bound to do so does not
operate as a sufficient consideration." Comment, Effect of Public Policy Upon Reward Offers,
20 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 396 (1963). Whereas a public officer might accept a reward if
1979]
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V. SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC SIDE EFFECTS OF THE STATUTES
The statutes in question have proven most unsatisfactory in ac-
tual application. Indigent parents have been loath to claim state
support for fear that the state would seek reimbursement from their
children. Many have preferred to suffer in silence rather than be the
cause of pressure on young, struggling families. The phobia of the
elderly of becoming a burden and their concomitant desire for inde-
pendence are plagued by the pride-inhibiting effect of the laws."
Economic ramifications of the statutes have been equally disas-
trous. The program perpetuates poverty by keeping a child from
properly providing for his own family or for his own retirement.
Frequently, the "able" child is just barely capable of assuming such
some part of the service he rendered were performed beyond the scope of his duty or on his
free time, CORBIN, supra note 37, § 180, at -261, other cases apply the common law principle
very strictly and refuse to allow policemen working on their own free time to collect re-
wards-at least within the confines of their own jurisdiction. In re Russell, 51 Conn. 577
(1884).
Another situation in which discharge of a pre-existing duty fails to provide consideration
for a subsequent promise is in the area of creditor-debtor relations. A debtor cannot promise
to pay his debt to a creditor and by that promise of a payment already owed extract a further
obligation or favor from his creditor. "A promise by a debtor or other obligor to perform his
already existing legal duty is binding without any new consideration whatever; and the fact
that the creditor gives some inoperative consideration is immaterial." CORBIN, supra note 37,
§ 191, at 274.
A third area where pre-existing duty cannot serve as consideration is in the context of
domestic relations. Where a wife sued a husband for default on a promise to pay her $100
per annum for performance of her domestic duties, the court held that such services were
obligatory and correlative to the marital status. The court found a nudbm pactum, a volun-
tary agreement wholly unsupported by consideration. Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 99 Ga.
Rep. 572, 27 S.E. 159 (1896). In a similar case, where a widow sought to recover from her
deceased husband's estate for services and care she had agreed to render to him in exchange
for payment, the court held that she was not entitled to recover the special value of such
services on a theory of quasi-contract or implied assumpsit. Again, the rationale was that the
pre-existing duty of a husband to support a wife could not be made the basis of an enforceable
agreement. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
In contrast, one case allowed a wife to collect on a promise by her husband to pay her for
services within the marital context. This situation involved a couple that had become es-
tranged and had lived apart. In order to induce his wife to take him back into her home and
to nurse and care for him, the husband promised to convey to her properly worth $6,000. After
his death, she sued successfully with the court finding adequate consideration. Since the
marital duty had been ruptured, ending the husband's right to services, the wife's agreement
to render such services was a new agreement going beyond and separate from the original
contract. In this new contract, furnishing marital services was no longer imposed by duty;
thus, consideration could be found. Young v. Cockman, 182 Md. 246, 34 A.2d 428 (1943).
44. Lopes, supra note 2, at 523.
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support, with the resulting shift of "economic desolation from one
generation to the next."45 Rather than burden their children or com-
promise their own pride, many indigent parents refuse to apply for
public aid at all. Thus, they recieve nothing from their children or
the state.46
VI. CONCLUSION
The "parental support" statutes have been examined and found
to have no rational basis biologically, through a love relationship,
or by contractual analogy to the parents' duty to support their chil-
dren. Having no rational basis, they are in direct violation of the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. One court
has found that these laws violate state constitutional provisions on
equal protection grounds.4 However, that court, while referring to
the California cases cited above, provided no analysis of the statutes
to support their conclusions.
The sociological impact of the parental support or filial support
laws is negative. Moral questions involved should remain a private
matter among family members. Thus viewed, the real duty to sup-
port the indigent elderly is a proper function of the state. An elderly
person has spent his or her lifetime contributing to society by his or
her labor, and it is society at large that has the duty to support the
indigent elderly in return.
These "parental support" statutes should, therefore, be declared
unconstitutional and state legislatures should repeal such laws
where they are on the books.
45. Id. at 526.
46. Id. at 527.
47. Hospital Services' Inc., v. Brooks, 229 N.W.2d 69 (N.D. 1975).
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